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The fiscal and distributive impacts of three reforms to the social security pension 
system in the UK are evaluated. All three reforms are designed to increase the 
retirement age by changing the incentive structure underlying the pension system. The 
first increases the state pension age by three years. The second introduces an actuarial 
adjustment to retirement both before and after age sixty five allowing deferral to age 
70. The final reform adapts the second reform to include a cap and a floor so as to 
mirror more closely the existing state pension scheme in the UK. Using a transition 
model of retirement, the simulations show that increasing the state pension age leads 
to a lower level of expenditure on the state pension, which is only partially offset 
through increased state spending on both means-tested income support and disability 
benefit (invalidity benefit). Employee national insurance receipts are also directly 
increased through the increase in the state pension age. The increase in retirement 
ages would also lead to an increase in government revenues arising from increased 
income tax and employee and employer national insurance contributions. As a result 
there would be lower levels of government borrowing (or larger government 
surpluses) than under the base system. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This paper forms part of the International Social Security project at the NBER. The 
authors are grateful to John Gruber, David Wise and participants of that project, to 
seminar participants at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and to Sarah Smith whose work 
on the previous stage of this project contributed towards this analysis. The 
Department of Social Security is thanked for financing the primary analysis of the 
second wave of the Retirement Survey, and for making the data available. Both waves 
of the Retirement Survey are now deposited at the ESRC Data Archive at the 
University of Essex. This research is part of the programme of research by the ESRC 
Centre for the Micro-Economic Analysis of Public Policy at IFS, and we are grateful 
to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding.   2
Executive Summary 
The main focus of this paper is to evaluate the impact on the Governments 
finances of different social security reforms in the UK. Each of the reforms 
considered is designed to increase the retirement age by changing the incentive 
structure underlying the pension system. The analysis takes in to account both the 
mechanical fiscal effects of implementing the reforms without allowing for 
behavioural responses as well as the full effects that account additionally for 
individual’s altering their retirement decisions in the light of the reformed pension 
system. To address the behavioural effects a transition model of retirement, based on 
micro data from the UK Retirement Survey, is used. This model is developed in 
Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2001) and their specification is adapted in this paper to 
provide simulations on individual data of three different pension reforms.  
  The first reform increases the state pension age by three years. This is 
estimated to lead to a lower level of expenditure on the state pension that is only 
partially offset through increased state spending on both means-tested income support 
and disability benefit (invalidity benefit). Employee national insurance receipts are 
also directly increased through the increase in the state pension age. The increase in 
retirement ages would also lead to an increase in government revenues arising from 
increased income tax and employee and employer national insurance contributions. 
As a result there would be lower levels of government borrowing (or larger 
government surpluses) than under the base system. 
The second introduces an actuarial adjustment to retirement both before and 
after age sixty five allowing deferral to age 70, while the final reform adapts the 
second reform to include a cap and a floor so as to mirror more closely the existing 
state pension scheme in the UK. Both of these reforms lead to a large increase in 
expenditure on the state pension, which is only very partially offset by reductions in 
spending on income support and invalidity benefit. There is also a smaller increase in 
tax receipts under each of these reforms. As a result there would be larger levels of 
government borrowing (or smaller government surpluses) than under the base system. 
The paper also assesses the distributional impact of each of the reforms. The 
distributional impact of increasing the state pension age depends on the specification 
of the retirement model. Under a smaller change in retirement ages many low pension 
wealth individuals will be compensated through receipt of income support. Reforms 2 
and 3 are found to lead to large gains across all but the top two wealth quintiles. This 
is due to the increases in the state pension not being sufficiently large to compensate 
richer individuals for the assumed loss of their private pension.   3
1. Introduction 
In this paper we evaluate the fiscal and distributive impact of social security 
reform in the UK. To examine this we consider three reforms to the state pension 
system that are all designed to increase the retirement age by changing the incentive 
structure underlying the pension system. We analyse both the mechanical fiscal 
effects of implementing the reforms without allowing for behavioural responses as 
well as the full effects that account additionally for individual’s altering their 
retirement decisions in the light of the reformed pension system. To address the 
behavioural effects we use a transition model of retirement that is based on micro data 
from the UK Retirement Survey. This model is developed in Blundell, Meghir and 
Smith (2001) and we adapt that specification in this paper to provide simulations on 
individual data of pension reforms. Before describing the reforms and the simulation 
model we introduce this study with some background concerning the current situation 
regarding pension reform in the UK. 
In line with other OECD countries, the UK will experience population ageing 
over the next few decades and a growth in the proportion of people aged 65 and over 
relative to the working-age population. However, this process is not likely to be as 
dramatic in the UK as it is predicted to be in Germany, Italy or Japan. The financial 
sustainability of the state pension system is not a substantive issue. Indeed, under 
current pension rules, the burden of state pensions is projected by the Government to 
fall slightly as a percentage of national income from 5.1% in 2001–02 to around 4.8% 
by 2050–51. Figure 1.1 also shows that expenditure on the basic state pension is 
forecast to fall as a share of national income. Expenditure on SERPS and the State 
Second Pension is forecast to rise, but by far less than would have been the case under 
the initial SERPS introduced in 1978.
 This is a consequence of a series of reforms to 
the pension system in the 1980s that dramatically reduced its generosity.
1 There is 
also an increase in forecast expenditure on the Minimum Income Guarantee and 
Pension Credit entitlement to both of which is means-tested.
2 
                                                 
1 See Emmerson and Johnson (2002) for more details. 
2 This is discussed further in Clark and Emmerson (2003).   4



















































Source: Figure A3.1, Page 148 of Department for Work and Pensions (2002). 
 
In contrast, the trend in the 1970s was towards a more generous state pension 
system. The main element of the state pension system, the basic state pension, was 
increased each year in line with earnings or prices or whichever was the greatest. In 
1978 a new second-tier earnings-related pension (the State Earnings-Related Pension 
Scheme, SERPS) was introduced that was originally intended to pay a pension worth 
25% of an individual’s best 20 years of earnings. However, SERPS was never a 
universal scheme for all employees. Workers who belonged to a defined benefit 
occupational pension could opt out of SERPS (and pay lower rates of National 
Insurance) so long as their occupational scheme guaranteed at least the same pension 
as SERPS. (In fact until 1988 employers were allowed to make membership of their 
occupational pension scheme a condition of employment). At the time that SERPS 
was introduced more than half of all employees, and more than two-thirds of male 
employees were opted out of the state scheme.
3  
It is worth bearing in mind that spending on pensions represents only part of 
total Government spending on benefits for older non-workers. In the 1980s there was 
a very large increase in the number of older non-workers on disability benefits
4 (see 
                                                 
3 For more details of the contracting out arrangements and their impact see, for example, Disney, Emmerson and 
Smith (2003). 
4 The main benefit was invalidity benefit, which was replaced by incapacity benefit in 1995.    5
Tanner, 1998) and spending on these benefits has more than doubled in real terms 
since 1990. As the level of the basic state pension is below the level of means-tested 
benefits for pensioners, many pensioners are eligible for means-tested benefits on top 
of their state pension. By April 2003 more than half of families with an individual 
aged 60 or over were entitled to means-tested benefits.
5 Means-testing is continuing to 
be increasingly important element in state provision for pensioners with the 
introduction of an earnings-indexed means-tested Pension Credit from October 2003. 
Since the early 1980s successive reforms have cut back the generosity of state 
pension provision. The indexation of the basic state pension to earnings lasted only 
until 1982, since when it has been formally indexed to prices and has fallen relative to 
average earnings. Reforms to SERPS introduced in 1986 and 1995 have reduced its 
generosity for anyone reaching the state pension age after 2000. Also, the state 
pension age for women, currently 60, is set to increase to 65 by 2020. These reforms 
were coupled with further encouragement for individuals to make private provision 
for their pension. The most important change was to give individuals the choice to 
‘opt out’ of SERPS into a defined contribution scheme from 1988 (or alternatively to 
leave their employers defined benefit scheme and join either a defined contribution 
pension or return to SERPS). In practice this meant a growth in individual retirement 
accounts (personal pensions) and the development of defined contribution 
occupational pensions. The growth in personal pensions was rapid. By the early 1990s 
they covered nearly one-quarter of employees and an even higher proportion of 
younger workers.  
The UK government is currently considering further pension reform. While 
the UK does not have a public finance problem in terms of future expected state 
expenditures (at least under the current settlement), there is concern that some 
individuals might not be making sufficient private provision for their retirement. 
Rather than change the structure of state pensions the latest proposals are for a 
simplification of the tax treatment of private pensions, and greater provision of 
information to individuals, in the hope that this will enable more appropriate private 
saving decisions to be made. The Government has also highlighted that later 
retirement is also a possible solution to any shortfall in retirement saving.
6  
In fact, like many other OECD countries, the UK has been experiencing a 
trend towards earlier labour market exits among older, particularly male, workers. The 
percentage of men aged 60-64 in employment halved from 1968, when over 80 per 
                                                 
5 See Table 4.2 of Banks, Blundell, Disney and Emmerson. 
6 The proposals are set out in Department for Work and Pensions (2002). For a discussion see, for example, 
Emmerson and Wakefield (2003).   6
cent were employed, to a little over 40% in 1996.
7 The fall in the proportion of older 
men who were in full-time employment was even greater than the fall in the 
proportion in any form of employment with a relative shift within the employed to 
self-employment and part-time employment. Female employment has not experienced 
the same downward trend – but this contrasts with rising participation among most 
other age groups of females across the same period. 
Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2001) looked at the extent to which these labour 
market trends might be explained by the financial incentives in the pension system 
that people faced when making their retirement decisions. In doing so, they focused 
not only on the pensions provided by the state, but also on employer-provided 
pensions and on other state benefits such as invalidity benefit, both of which have 
played a crucial role in the UK. They found significant accrual and pension wealth 
effects, reflecting the substitution and wealth effects of pension systems on the 
incentive to retire. 
Compared to many other European countries, the UK stands out as having a 
high level of coverage of private pensions and, at least in recent years, a trend towards 
less generous state pension provision. The models of retirement behaviour estimated 
in the Blundell, Meghir and Smith study fully account for the incentives underlying 
private occupational schemes and those estimates are used in this paper to analyse the 
fiscal impact of pension reform. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the UK pension 
system and the key elements that are likely to affect retirement behaviour. Section 3 
presents the basic empirical model we use to simulate the ‘behavioural’ effects of 
pension reform. Section 4 describes the simulation methodology and the set of policy 
reforms. In Sections 5 the simulation results from three policy reforms designed to 
reduce the incentives for early retirement in the current pension system are presented. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. Institutional Features of the UK State Pension Scheme 
The UK pension system is three-tiered. Figure 2.1 provides a summary 
diagram of these three tiers. A more detailed discussion can be found in, for example, 
Banks and Emmerson (2000). The first tier, provided by the state, consists of the basic 
state pension and a significant level of means-tested benefits (made more significant 
by the introduction of the Minimum Income Guarantee for those aged 60 and over in 
April 1999). The second tier, compulsory for all employees with earnings above a 
                                                 
7 See Banks, Blundell, Disney and Emmerson (2002) or Disney and Hawkes (2003).   7
certain floor, is made up of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS)
8 and 
a large and continually growing level of private provision. Finally, there is third tier 
consisting of additional voluntary contributions and other private insurance.  
2.1 The Basic State Pension 
The basic state pension is a flat-rate contributory benefit payable to people 
aged over the state pension age (65 for men and 60 for women
9) who have made 
sufficient contributions throughout their working lives.
10 In April 2003 the basic state 
pension was worth £77.45 a week for a single pensioner. Prior to 1978 married 
women could opt to pay a reduced rate of National Insurance which meant they did 
not qualify for a basic state pension in their own right. Couples in which one partner 
does not qualify for the basic state pension receive a dependant addition, irrespective 
of whether they have ever worked or not. Since 1989 there has been no earnings test 
for receipt of the basic state pension.
11 Individuals who choose to defer their state 
pension currently receive an additional 1% for every seven weeks of deferral, and the 
Government has announced that this is set to be changed to 1% for every five weeks. 
2.2 The State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) 
The first part of the second tier of pension provision is the State Earnings-
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Introduced in 1978, this pays a pension equal to a 
fraction of an individual’s qualifying annual earnings (above a specified lower 
earnings limit) each year since 1978. When it was introduced, SERPS was intended to 
pay a pension worth one-quarter of an individual’s best twenty years’ earnings (up to 
a specified upper earnings limit). Subsequent reductions in the generosity of SERPS 
mean that it will eventually only be worth 20 per cent of average lifetime earnings. 
Married women who opted to pay reduced rate National Insurance contributions do 
not qualify for SERPS. Currently widows can claim their husbands’ SERPS pensions 
in full if they receive no additional pension in their own right.
12 After retirement the 
SERPS pension is uprated each year in line with prices. 
                                                 
8 The State Second Pension replaced SERPS in April 2002. This is more generous to lower earners. For a discussion 
see, for example, Agulnik (1999) or Disney, Emmerson and Tanner (1999). 
9 The state pension age for women will be raised by six months each year from 2010 to 2020 so that equalisation is 
achieved in 2020. 
10 To qualify for the basic state pension, individuals need to have made or be credited with National Insurance 
contributions for 90 per cent of their working lives. Credits are available for periods of illness, disability or 
unemployment. Since the introduction of Home Responsibilities Protection in 1978 the number of years of 
contributions required can be reduced by time spent caring for children or another dependent.  
11 See Disney and Smith (2000) for a discussion of the effects of the abolition of the earnings test on labour supply. 
12 This was due to be reduced to half from April 2000. However the failure of the Government to properly inform 
individuals of the change in entitlement led to the reform being delayed.   8
2.3 Income Support and Invalidity Benefit 
In addition to the basic state pension and SERPS, there are two other state 
benefits that are taken up widely by older non-workers – income support and 
incapacity benefit (formerly invalidity benefit). Income support is a flat rate, non-
contributory means-tested benefit. It is payable to those aged 60 or over who are on 
low incomes and are not in paid employment. Unlike people in younger age groups, 
those aged 60 and over do not have to show that they are actively seeking work in 
order to qualify. From April 1999, income support for pensioners was renamed the 
Minimum Income Guarantee and made more generous with an increase in the level 
and a commitment to uprate in line with earnings, at least for the short-medium term. 
The generosity of means-tested benefits was extended further with the introduction of 
the pension credit in October 2003 which will be payable to lower income individuals 
aged 65 or over.
13  
Incapacity benefit (formerly invalidity benefit) is a contributory benefit paid to 
the long-term sick and disabled. In the case of invalidity benefit an individual 
qualified on the basis of medical certificates from their GP showing them to be 
incapable of work that was ‘reasonable’ to expect them to do (given their age, 
qualifications etc). With the introduction of incapacity benefit in 1995 this was 
changed to a stricter ‘all work test’ carried out by a doctor employed by the Benefits 
Agency Medical Service. The change from invalidity benefit to incapacity benefit was 
a response to very rapid growth in receipt during the 1980s. A key feature of 
incapacity benefit (and invalidity benefit) is that, before April 2001, it was not means-
tested and could be received in conjunction with private pension income (unlike 
income support). Since April 2001, it has been means-tested against individual 
occupational pension income. 
2.4 Occupational and Personal Pensions 
Compared to most other European countries the UK has a high level of 
coverage of private pensions, including both occupational pensions and individual 
retirement accounts, known in the UK as Personal Pensions. Any employee can 
choose to contract out of SERPS, into one of these two types of secondary private 
pension. (From April 2001 people have also been able to choose to opt out into a 
stakeholder pension, which is effectively a benchmarked individual retirement 
account). Members of defined benefit and defined contribution occupational schemes 
pay a reduced rate of National Insurance, while those with personal or stakeholder 
pensions receive a National Insurance rebate paid directly into their fund.  
                                                 
13 For an explanation of the pension credit, its impact on savings incentives, and the implications of earnings 
indexation to eligibility over time see Clark and Emmerson (2003).    9
In 2000 occupational pensions covered 10.1 million individuals, down from 11 
million in the mid 1980s. They are typically defined benefit schemes (see Table 2.1), 
although since 1988 employees have also been allowed to opt out into defined 
contribution occupational schemes and there has been a gradual shift from DB to DC 
schemes since then (see Disney and Stears, 1996). The decline in coverage of 
occupational pension plans is due to a number of factors. It reflects changing 
employment patterns and a shift to smaller employers. Also, it reflects increasing 
pension choice among individuals working for employers offering occupational 
pensions who, since 1988, can no longer be compelled to join the scheme.  
Table 2.1 Occupational schemes, Defined benefit versus defined contribution 





     
Number of members (million):       
Defined Benefit plans  4.6  4.5  9.1 
Defined Contribution planes  0.9  —  0.9 
Hybrid schemes  0.1  —  0.1 
Total 5.7  4.5  10.1 
     
% of members in each type:       
Defined Benefit plans  81  100  90 
Defined Contribution planes  16  —  9 
Hybrid schemes  2  —  1 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: Table 3.2 of Government Actuary’s Department (2003). 
Since 1988 individuals have been able to contract out of SERPS (and leave 
their occupational scheme) and take out a personal pension. To kick-start these 
schemes when they were introduced a bonus National Insurance contribution of 2 per 
cent was paid by the government, in addition to the contracted-out rebate. By the mid-
1990s, around 6 million people (more than one-quarter of all employees) had taken 
out a personal pension. Take-up was higher among younger workers as would be 
expected. However, there is a serious issue over the number of older workers who 
were ‘mis-sold’ personal pensions by financial advisers who wrongly advised them 
that they would be better off leaving their occupational pension plan.    10
Table 2.2 Labour market participation and benefit receipt  
















M e n            
50-54  0.6447  0.2053 0.1500 0.0000 0.0947 0.0737 0.0237 0.0658 
55-59  0.4620  0.1881 0.3598 0.0000 0.3432 0.1386 0.0825 0.0728 
60-64  0.2680  0.1787 0.5533 0.0000 0.5395 0.2096 0.1478 0.1237 
65-69  0.0213  0.0816 0.8972 0.8121 0.7411 0.1667 0.1312 0.0532 
W o m e n            
50-54  0.4667  0.2427 0.2907 0.0507 0.1040 0.0400 0.0133 0.0480 
55-59  0.2936  0.2385 0.4679 0.0975 0.1988 0.0398 0.0061 0.0520 
60-64  0.0909  0.1394 0.7697 0.7970 0.3606 0.0242 0.0152 0.0485 
65-69  0.0156  0.0688 0.9156 0.9594 0.4125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0469 
Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1994-95 
Table 2.2 summarises labour market participation and income receipt by age 
using data from the Family Expenditure Survey 1994-95 (corresponding to the second 
wave of the Retirement Survey). It shows relatively high rates of labour market 
withdrawal among men before the state pension age. The two most important sources 
of income before state pension age are income from private (predominantly 
occupational) pensions and disability benefit. It is important to stress that these two 
sources of income are not always alternative pre-retirement income sources, but are 
typically received together by the same people. The fact that disability benefit was not 
means-tested meant that it could be received in conjunction with other forms of 
income. Three-quarters of people in receipt of disability benefit income also received 
some money from a private pension. 
3. The Basic Empirical Model 
  The simulated responses used in this paper are based on the retirement model 
presented in Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2002). This model was estimated using the 
UK Retirement Survey and in this section we briefly review the model and 
specification of pension incentives. We also present the estimated model that is used 
in the simulations.
14 
3.1 The data 
The main data used for analysing retirement behaviour are drawn from the UK 
Retirement Survey (RS), a household panel survey collected by the Office for 
Population and Census Surveys on behalf of the Department for Social Security. This 
                                                 
14 For other studies of retirement behaviour in the UK see, for example, Blundell and Johnson (1998, 1999), Disney, 
Meghir and Whitehouse (1994) and Tanner (1998).   11
is the first large-scale panel data set in the UK to focus on individuals around the time 
of retirement. Two waves of data were collected on a national random sample of 
individuals born between 1919-1933. The first wave of the survey was conducted 
between November 1988 – January 1989 and collected information on 3,543 ‘key 
respondents’ (who were aged 55-69). The key respondents include spouses if they 
were in the relevant age range. In addition, information was also collected on 609 
spouses outside this age range. About two-thirds of the original sample were re-
interviewed in 1994. 11% of respondents disappeared in this interval due to mortality; 
the residual attrition is a combination of non-response and (perhaps) unreported 
mortality.
15 
The Retirement Survey offers a relatively large sample of people in the 
relevant age range, compared to more general panel surveys such as the British 
Household Panel Survey. It also offers very rich demographic, economic and health 
information on individuals – and their spouses – in both waves. And it has 
employment history information and private pension history information dating right 
back to individuals’ first jobs.
16 However, compared to the administrative datasets 
available in other countries, the sample in the Retirement Survey is relatively small 
(and is reduced by the high attrition rate between the two waves). Also, the survey 
does not collect earnings history information which is needed to calculate exact 
pension entitlements for each individual. Instead, we impute earnings histories on the 
basis of employment history information.  
3.2 The Pension Incentive Calculations 
3.2.1 The basic state pension 
Calculation of basic state pension entitlement is straightforward. It depends on 
the total number of years’ contributions and, for a married woman, on whether she 
opted to pay reduced rate National Insurance contributions. This latter piece of 
information is known directly from the Retirement Survey.  
Although the basic state pension is flat rate, total wealth will vary across 
individuals because of the dependant’s allowance and because of the fact that widows 
not entitled to a pension in their own right can claim their former spouse’s pension in 
full when their spouse dies. In these cases, we need to compute husbands’ total 
pension wealth over the life of the couple, based on the age difference between the 
                                                 
15 The high attrition rate is largely due to the fact that the survey was not originally intended to be a panel survey. 
Hence, little attempt was made to keep in touch with respondents after the first wave. Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) 
use the retirement survey to look at the impact of wealth on morbidity and mortality and incorporate the possibility 
that attrition may be correlated with mortality. 
16 For a good overview of information in the Retirement Survey see Disney, Grundy and Johnson (1998)   12
spouses. Obviously, the larger the age difference between husband and wife, the 
greater the husband’s total pension wealth.  
3.2.2 State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme 
The precise formula for calculating an individual’s SERPS pension is given 
by:  
Earnings up to the annual upper earnings limit (UEL) are re-valued to the year of 
reaching state pension age (R) using an index of economy-wide average earnings 
(YR/Yt). The lower earnings limit (LEL) in the year prior to the individual reaching 
state pension age is deducted from each year’s re-valued earnings figure and the net of 
LEL earnings are multiplied by an accrual factor (χRt).
17 For people retiring before 
2000 the accrual rate was 1.25% a year. Details of earnings factors, upper and lower 
earnings limits and accrual rates are given in Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2001). 
Having calculated earnings profiles for each individual in the Retirement Survey, their 
SERPS entitlements are fairly straightforward to calculate. We assume zero SERPS 
pension for people who are in occupational pension plans and for married women 
who have opted to pay reduced rate National Insurance contributions.  
Accrual rates have changed since 2000, but this reform will not affect the 
cohort of individuals in the Retirement Survey all of whom will have reached the state 
pension age before then. Finally, the fact that widows can claim their former 
husbands’ SERPS pensions if they receive no pension in their own right means that, 
as with the basic state pension, a man’s marital status, and the age difference between 
them and their spouse also affects their total pension wealth and accrual.  
3.2.3 Invalidity benefit 
One possible way to treat entitlement to invalidity benefit would be to assume 
that only individuals who received the benefit were eligible, and that all those who 
satisfied the eligibility conditions received the benefit. However, given the potential 
for subjective evaluation of ‘incapacity for work’ and ‘reasonable work’ and in the 
light of significant variation in the number of people receiving the benefit over time, 
as well as anecdotal evidence of differences between doctors in their willingness to 
certify individuals as being incapable of work, this assumption is inappropriate. 
                                                 
17 From April 2000 this formula changed. Instead of up-rating annual earnings and then subtracting the LEL from the 
year prior to retirement, the lower earnings limit from the year worked is subtracted from earnings first and then the 
difference is uprated in line with earnings growth. Since the LEL is annually uprated in line with the Basic State 
Pension, i.e. with prices, this has the effect of reducing the generosity of SERPS. 
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Instead, we calculate an individual’s invalidity benefit wealth on the basis of an 
assigned probability that they will receive the benefit. These probabilities are derived 
in Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2001) from a probit model for receipt of invalidity 
benefit as a function of characteristics such as age, education, region, tenure, marital 
status and spouse’s employment status, which we estimate using data drawn from the 
Family Expenditure Survey from April 1988 – March 1994. We impute probabilities 
for individuals in the Retirement Survey on the basis of matched characteristics.  
3.2.4 Occupational pensions 
The pension received in a defined benefit occupational pension plan is 
typically determined by a formula of the type:  
P = χ(PER — βLELR-1)N 
where P is the annual occupational pension, χ is the scheme-specific accrual rate, PER 
is ‘pensionable earnings’ at the time of retirement which are typically the individual’s 
average earnings in the last year, or last few years, before retirement, β is the 
‘integration factor’ and N is the number of years that the individual has belonged to 
the scheme. From information in the Retirement Survey, we know N, the number of 
years the individual has belonged to the scheme. However, we have to make 
reasonable assumptions about χRt, PER and β.  
The key distinction that we make is between individuals who work in the 
public sector versus those in the private sector. We assume that different typical 
schemes apply in the two sectors with different accrual rates, definitions of 
pensionable earnings and integration factors. We assume an accrual rate of 1/60th for 
private sector and 1/80th for public sector. For pensionable earnings we take the best 
three out of last ten years’ earnings for individuals working in the private sector and 
the best year’s earnings out of the last ten years for individuals working in the public 
sector. We assume an integration factor of 1 for private sector schemes and 0 for 
public sector schemes.  
3.3 Total pension wealth and pension incentive measures 
In the analysis of the incentive effects of pensions on retirement presented in 
Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2001), three different forward-looking measures of 
accrual were used. The first was simply the one-period accrual, i.e. how much an 
individual can add to their total pension wealth by working this period. The second 
was peak value. This represents the difference between total pension wealth 
accumulated by the start of the period and the maximum total pension wealth an 
individual could accumulate looking forward across all future years. This is a more 
appropriate measure if it is assumed that labour market exits by older workers are   14
irreversible. In this case, when someone leaves the labour market they are giving up 
all possible future additions to their pension and will therefore consider how much 
they could increase their pension by staying in the labour market not just this period, 
but in all future periods. By not retiring now, individuals retain an option to retire in 
the future and, thereby, to increase their pension. This is very similar in spirit to the 
option value (Stock and Wise, 1990a, 1990b), which is the third measure used.  
In the option value model individuals are assumed to compare the value of 
retiring now to the maximum of the expected values of retiring at all future ages, 
where the value of retiring at future ages includes both possible pension additions and 
future earnings, i.e.  


















where Ys is earnings and Bs retirement benefits. The option value differs from the peak 
value by incorporating the future value of earnings until retirement and by 
incorporating utility parameters k, the differential value of income in leisure compared 
to earned income and γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In our calculation of 
option values we assume k = 1.5 and γ = 0.75. We assume a discount factor, β, of 0.97 
throughout. 
3.4 The Retirement Probability Model 
 A summary of the estimated retirement model results are presented in Table 
3.1. These are the estimated marginal effects from a Probit model of transitions into 
retirement. A full set of results are presented in Appendix A. This model specification 
includes both an option value accrual term as well as separate terms for pension 
wealth. The wealth terms relate to the discounted present value of pension wealth for 
the individual whose retirement we are modelling and that of his or her spouse. Two 
specifications are considered in the simulations reported here. The first relates to a 
model in which there is a separate dummy variable for each age. The second simply 
includes a linear age trend. The specification of age dummies in a retirement 
transition model is clearly important. These two specifications provide a range of 
specifications over which to compare our simulation results. 
In each specification, the coefficients on these wealth are always strongly 
significant and suggest that the restrictions underlying the standard option value 
model need to be relaxed to allow saving and borrowing against future pension 
wealth. If these wealth variables are excluded the option value coefficient becomes 
much larger and significantly negative. For example the coefficient becomes –0.903 
(0.275) for the first model that contains a full set of time dummies.   15
In all cases the pension wealth and option value variables are jointly 
significant. These results are consistent with the presence of both income and 
substitution effects in retirement decisions.
18 The positive coefficient on the total 
pension wealth variable points to an income effect, whereby individuals who 
accumulate a lot in earlier years retire earlier. The impact of the option value reflects 
foregone future opportunities from stopping working now; the negative coefficient on 
this term indicates that the greater those foregone opportunities, the less likely 
individuals are to retire. Since the incentive variables are measured in €100,000, the 
coefficient of –0.5145 on the option value for example, implies that a €10,000 rise in 
the option values (leaving pension wealth unaffected) reduces the probability of 
retirement by a little over five percentage points.
19   
The behavioural adjustments in the counterfactual simulations presented in the 
next section reflect these estimated marginal effects. 
 
Table 3.1: Estimated retirement transition models, with a full set of time 
dummies and with a linear time trend only. 
  Full set of time 
dummies 
Linear time trend only
          















        
Number of observations  1,998 1,998 
Pseudo R
2 0.197 0.153 
Log likelihood  –661.525 –697.758 
  
 
Notes: Marginal effects are report. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by 
*** = 1% level, ** = 5% level, *=10% level.  
The full set of demographic controls include earnings (and earnings squared), education, health, job 
tenure, industry, proportion of time spent in full-time employment, whether individual has an 
occupational pension, housing tenure, financial wealth, age difference within couples, spouse’s 
earnings, spouse’s health and whether spouse is retired. See Table A.1. 
                                                 
18 The option value and total pension wealth measures are in €100,000s while net earnings are in €1,000s. 
19 It is worth noting that the option value is significant and slightly larger in size for men as is also shown in the 
Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2001) study. However, it  is much less precisely estimated for women. In our simulations 
we chose to use the combined sample results as presented in Table 3.1.   16
 
4. The Pension Policy Reforms and Simulation Methodology 
As we have seen each individual’s total pension wealth and pension accrual 
measures are built up from combining four separate elements of the pension system – 
the basic state pension, the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), 
occupational pensions and disability benefit (invalidity benefit).
20 Here we outline the 
nature of the pension reforms and the methodology used for simulation. 
4.1 Reform 1 (Increased state pension age) 
The first reform concerns an increase the state pension age for everyone by 
three years. Hence under this reform the state pension age is 68 for men and 63 for 
women. We also augment the normal occupational pension retirement ages by three 
years. There is clearly a correspondence in practice between the state pension ages 
and the normal retirement ages in occupational pension plans, so increasing the state 
pension could be expected to have such a knock-on effect on occupational pension 
plans. Moreover, the increases in life expectancy that, in part, might cause the 
government to reduce the generosity of the state pension system could have a similar 
effect on occupational schemes. 
4.2 Reform 2 (Common reform) 
The second reform assumes a pension system of the following five components: 
(a) An early entitlement age of 60; (b) A normal retirement age of 65; (c) A 60% 
replacement rate at age 65; (d) A 6% actuarial adjustment from 60 to 70: and (e) No 
other pathways to retirement.  
This system is considerably more expensive to the exchequer than the existing 
UK state pension system. This can be shown by the fact that entitlement to a full basic 
state pension is worth approximately 15% of average earnings with entitlement to the 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) at most around 30% of average 
earnings (since it provides 20% of earnings between the a lower and an upper 
threshold, with the former worth about 15% of average earnings and the latter set at 
around 150% of average earnings
21). However, it should be noted that this reformed 
system is not more generous to all individuals. This is because it removes the 
possibility of ‘retiring’ onto means-tested income support or disability benefit 
(invalidity benefit). In the base system those who reach retirement with no or little 
                                                 
20 We ignore income support since it is a universal benefit.  
21 These are known as the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) and the Upper Earnings Limit (UEL) respectively.   17
other income will be eligible for means-tested income support, which essentially tops-
up their income to that of the social security safety net. In addition those able to meet 
the health criteria will be able to receive the flat rate invalidity benefit (which prior to 
April 2001 was not means-tested) on top of any other occupational pension income 
that they might have. 
In addition higher income individuals might also lose from this reformed 
system since it is assumed that the more generous state system will replace 
occupational pensions (both public and private). Hence those whose occupational 
pension plan provides a replacement rate more generous than this reformed state 
scheme will lose out. For example those in a private sector occupational pension plan 
are assumed to have an accrual rate of 1/60 – hence someone with 40 years of service 
would receive a replacement rate of 40/60 = 2/3rds (integrated with the basic state 
pension) which is greater than the 60% offered at 65 under reform 2. Those who retire 
before 65 will be entitled to even less under the reformed system. Those in public 
sector occupational pension plans were assumed to have an accrual rate of 1/80, but 
not integrated with the basic state pension. This means that whether or not someone 
with 40 years of service is better of under the reformed system will depend on 
whether the 60% replacement rate is greater than 50% of their final salary (i.e. 40/80) 
plus the basic state pension. 
4.3 Reform 3 (Modified common reform) 
Reform 2 is strongly based on reform 2, but modified to bring it slightly more 
into line with the base UK pension system. Under this reform the state pension system 
still offers a replacement rate of 60% at age 65 (with the same accrual structure as 
under reform 2), but it also has a floor on benefits equal to the basic state pension, and 
a ceiling set at the higher threshold above which additional employee National 
Insurance Contributions are not paid.
22 In addition both means-tested income support 
and disability benefit (invalidity benefit) are retained until age 60. As a result only 
high income individuals can be worse off under reform 3 compared to reform 2 (due 
to the fact that under reform 3 maximum pension income is capped). Furthermore the 
retention of means-tested income support will mean that low income individuals 
cannot be worse off under reform 3 than they are under the base system, since retired 
low income individuals will be able to receive means-tested income support until age 
60 and then a state pension worth at least the basic state pension from this age 
onwards. 
                                                 
22 Known in UK parlance as the Upper Earnings Limit.   18
5. Effect of Policy Reforms 
This section uses the estimated retirement transition models described in 
section 3 to model the impact of each of the reforms set out in sections 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 
on retirement ages and the government’s finances. This impact is then separated into 
the ‘mechanical’ impact of the reform, namely that would arise if retirement ages 
were fixed, and the ‘behavioural’ impact of the reform, that is the fiscal implications 
of any modelled change in retirement ages. We then turn to examine the distributional 
impact of each of the reforms. 
5.1 Retirement ages and fiscal implications of reform 1, using a retirement model 
with a full set of age dummies 
The effect of raising the state pension age is to reduce the median level of total 
pension wealth and to increase option values, compared to the existing pension 
system. The income and substitution effects work in the same direction and the 
combined effect is to reduce the conditional probability of retirement at younger ages. 
The precise magnitude of the effect of reforming the state pension system depends on 
which specification is used. When a full set of age dummies is included these tend to 
dominate any of the pension wealth and accrual incentives and the effect of reforming 
the pension system appears to be very small. To the extent that the age dummies pick 
up the incentive effects, these would need to be adjusted to reflect the pivotal ages in 
the new system. Under the base system, with a full set of age dummies included, the 
mean retirement age is estimated at 63.1. 
The first reform, which increases the state pension age for both men and 
women by three years, is estimated to increase this to 63.5 if the estimated age effects 
are assumed to be unchanged by the reform. Under the alternative assumption, that 
the reformed system would lead directly to a shift in the estimated age effects this 
rises to 64.9. Figure 5.1a shows the estimated distribution of retirement ages under 
both of these assumptions compared to the estimated distribution in the base pension 
system. This shows that the distribution of retirement ages under the base system and 
under reform 1 when the estimated age effects are held constant are very similar, 
although the reform does lead to slightly fewer retirements between 56 and 60 
(inclusive) and more retirements occurring between 62 and 70 (inclusive). As 
expected when the reform is also assumed to shift the estimated age effects this leads 
to larger differences in the distribution of retirement ages. The spikes in the base 
system that occurred at 60 and 65 (which are the state pension ages for women and 
men respectively) now occur at 63 and 68.  
Increasing the state pension age would lead to a lower level of expenditure on 
the state pension. The increase in retirement ages would also lead to an increase in 
government revenues arising from increased income tax and national insurance   19
contributions. Both of these would lead to lower levels of government borrowing (or 
larger government surpluses) than under the base system. At least in part this impact 
will be offset by increased state spending on both means-tested income support and 
disability benefit (invalidity benefit). Estimates of the government expenditure and 
government revenues from these sources under both the base system and under reform 
1 are presented in table 5.1. Under the base system expenditure on the state pension to 
this cohort of individuals is estimated to be €24.7bn. Under the reformed system 
(assuming no change in the estimated age effects) this is reduced by 24.2% to 
€18.7bn. As we will show later (in section 5.4) this comprises a slightly larger 
‘mechanical’ effect arising from the increase in the state pension age, offset slightly 
by an increase in some individuals entitlements to the State Earnings-Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS) arising from the increased retirement age. Reduced spending on the 
state pension is partially offset by a large increase in expenditure on disability benefit 
(invalidity benefit) of 40.7% and a tripling in expenditure on means-tested income 
support (increase of 200.3%). Overall state expenditures are still reduced by 12.1%. 
Under the alternative assumption, that the increase in the increase in the state pension 
age also shifts the estimated age effects, the savings from reduced expenditure on the 
state pension are reduced. This is because the larger upwards shift in retirement ages 
leads to higher expenditure on the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) 
than when the age effects are held fixed. This increase in state pension spending is 
almost entirely offset by a reduction in expenditure on means-tested income support. 
Overall expenditure under the model with the shift in age effects is 11.5% lower than 
under the base case compared to the 12.1% lower found when the age effects are held 
constant.  
Turning to the impact of increasing the state pension age on government 
receipts this reform will also have both a direct impact and an indirect impact. The 
direct impact will be through increased employee national insurance contributions on 
earnings as these will now be paid up to the higher state pension age. (There is no 
corresponding direct impact on employers national insurance contributions as these 
are levied on the earnings of individuals aged both below and above the state pension 
age). There will also be a direct effect leading to reduced income tax receipts levied 
on both state and private pension income due to increase in the pension age. The 
indirect impact of reform 1 arises as a result of the increased average retirement age. 
This will increase income tax and employees and employers national insurance 
contributions. Table 5.1 shows that in the base system total government receipts from 
these taxes are estimated at €40.6bn. This estimated comprises of employee national 
insurance contributions of €5.4bn, employers national insurance contributions of 
€7.0bn and income tax receipts of €28.2bn. The table shows that total revenues from 
these three taxes exceeds total spending on means-tested income support, invalidity 
benefit and state pension. This means that the ‘excess’ revenues are essentially being 
used to pay for other items of public expenditure or to reduce public debt.   20
We find that under reform 1, assuming no change in the estimated age effects, 
employee national insurance is increased by 20.0%. The increases in employer 
national insurance is smaller at 5.8%, which is not surprising since this is only from 
the indirect impact of an increased average retirement age discussed above. The 
increase in income tax receipts is smaller still at 5.7%. Increased income tax receipts 
under reform 1 shows that the direct impact of lower receipts on pension income is 
more than offset by the impact of an increased average retirement age. Overall income 
tax and national insurance revenues are estimated to be 7.6% higher. 
Under the alternative assumption that the increase in the state pension age 
would also shift the estimated age effects by a full three years we find that 
government revenues from each of these three sources would be increased further. 
This is due to the larger increase in average retirement ages that occurs under this 
assumption. Overall tax and national insurance revenues would be 18.7% higher than 
under the base system, compared to the 7.6% found above. 
The overall impact on the Government’s finances from the items modelled is 
also presented in table 5.1. Under the base system there is a net surplus of €12.4bn. 
This is increased by 52.1% to €18.9bn under the model where the age effects are held 
fixed. It is increased by 87.1% to €23.3bn under the model where age effects are, by 
assumption, fully shifted by 3 years. In part these percentages are inflated by the fact 
that they are being compared to the net surplus. However the fiscal gains to the 
exchequer are also large when compared to gross expenditures. Under the model with 
no shift in the estimated age effects the increase in the net surplus of €6.5bn 
represents 26.2% of gross expenditure. Under the model with a full three-year shift in 
the estimated age effects the increase in the net surplus of €10.8bn represents 43.5% 
of gross expenditure. 
The reduction in net expenditure (increase in net surplus) disaggregated by age 
of retirement is shown in figure 5.1b. Under the base system there is an overall net 
expenditure from the state on those who retire before age 59. This is because the 
expenditure and revenues are calculated over ages 56 to 77 and therefore taxes on 
earnings from those who retire this early will often be low (or for those who retire at 
56 zero). Net expenditure peaks at age 65 – this is not due to those retiring at this age 
being particularly expensive to the state but due to the fact that 65 is the most 
common retirement age (as shown in figure 5.1a). Under reform 1 the pattern of net 
expenditures varies by the assumption that is made to the interpretation of the age 
effects. Under the assumption that there is no shift in the estimated age effects the 
pattern of net expenditure is quite similar to that observed in the base system although 
there is unsurprisingly a particularly large reduction in net expenditure (i.e. an 
increase in the net surplus) among those who retire at age 65. Under the assumption 
that the estimated age effects are shifted by the full three years the spike at 65 is 
shifted to age 68.   21
The estimated impact on the exchequer of an increase in the state pension age 
can also be disaggregated into the impact on gross expenditures and the impact on 
gross government revenues. This is shown in figures 5.1c and 5.1d. The spike in gross 
expenditures occurring at age 65 is reduced under the assumption that the age effects 
are fixed, and is reduced and moved to age 68 under the assumption that reform leads 
to a shift in the age effects by three years. Turning to government revenues – under 
the first assumption the revenue received from those retiring at age 65 is increased, 
and under the second assumption it is both increased and shifted to age 68. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Total fiscal impact of reform 1, option value model with a full set of 
age dummies. 
  € (million)  % change on base system




 (age shift) 




 (age shift) 
       
State pension  € 24,733  € 18,741  € 19,739  –24.2%  –20.2% 
Invalidity Benefit € 2,619  € 3,685  € 3,671  40.7%  40.2% 
Income Support  € 765  € 2,297  € 1,470  200.3%  92.2% 
Total spending  € 28,117  € 24,723  € 24,881  –12.1%  –11.5% 
       
Employee NI  € 5,354  € 6,427  € 6,758  20.0%  26.2% 
Employer NI  € 7,045  € 7,457  € 8,261  5.8%  17.3% 
Income Tax  € 28,156  € 29,755  € 33,130  5.7%  17.7% 
Total Tax  € 40,555  € 43,639  € 48,150  7.6%  18.7% 
       
Net expenditure  –€ 12,438  –€ 18,916  –€ 23,269  52.1%  87.1% 
       
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see section 3.   22
Table 5.2. Total fiscal impact of reforms 2 and 3, option value model with a full 
set of age dummies. 
  € (million)  % change on base system
  Base  Reform 2  Reform3  Reform 2  Reform3 
    
State pension  € 24,733  € 73,498  € 80,087  197.2%  223.8% 
Invalidity Benefit € 2,619  € 0  € 731  –100.0%  –72.1% 
Income Support  € 765  € 0  € 954  –100.0%  24.7% 
Total spending  € 28,117  € 73,498  € 81,772  161.4%  190.8% 
       
Employee NI  € 5,354  € 6,828  € 6,561  27.5%  22.6% 
Employer NI  € 7,045  € 8,546  € 8,128  21.3%  15.4% 
Income Tax  € 28,156  € 41,769  € 40,590  48.3%  44.2% 
Total Tax  € 40,555  € 57,143  € 55,279  40.9%  36.3% 
       
Net expenditure  –€ 12,438  € 16,355  € 26,494  n/a  n/a 
    
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see section 3; Given the move from net 
surplus to a net deficit under reforms 2 and reform 3 it is not possible to express the change in net 
expenditure as a percentage. 
 
5.2 Retirement ages and fiscal implications of reforms 2 and 3, using a retirement 
model with a full set of age dummies 
Under both reform 2 and reform 3 median level of total pension wealth is 
increased. The income effect from these reforms will therefore tend to reduce 
retirement ages. The substitution effect will tend to work in the opposite direction 
with state pension rights being increased by 6% for each year of additional work 
between 60 and 70. This is in contrast to under the base system where the basic state 
pension and the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) become payable at 
the state pension age regardless of whether an individual has actually retired. The 
option value effect is reinforced in reform 2 by the absence of any non-pension 
benefits (such as disability benefits) before retirement age under the simulated reform 
that increases the incentive to stay in work. In both reform 2 and reform 3 the overall 
effect on retirement behaviour is to lead to an increase in the average retirement age. 
Under the base system this is estimated to be 63.1, under reform 2 it is estimated to be 
64.6 and under reform 3 it is estimated to be 63.9. The fact that average retirement 
ages are closer in reform 3 to the base system than there are in reform 2 is perhaps not 
surprising as the reform 3 system is, by design, closer to the base system.   23
The estimated distribution of retirement ages under both reform 2 and reform 
3 are shown in figure 5.2a alongside those arising from the base system. Under all 
three systems the most common retirement ages are 60 and 65. This corresponds to 
the state pension ages for women and men respectively in the base pension system. 
These spikes are the result of the estimated age effects from the base pension system 
and therefore could be expected to change under the reformed system. Reform 2 leads 
to lower retirement rates at all ages up to 63 (inclusive) and correspondingly higher 
retirement rates up to age 76. The large fall in retirements prior to age 60 is 
unsurprising as under reform 2 they would receive no pension income until they 
reached 60. Turning to reform 3: for all ages between 56 and 73 the retirement rates 
under reform 3 are estimated to be between those under the base system and those 
under reform 2. Again this is to be expected given the design of the system. 
  Both reform 2 and reform 3 represent more generous and therefore expensive 
state pension systems than the existing UK pension system. This is shown in table 5.2. 
Total state expenditure is estimated to be €73.5bn under reform 2 and €81.8bn under 
reform 3 compared to €28.1bn under the base system. Under reform 2 this increase in 
spending is due to a large increase in spending on the state pension, which is partially 
offset by the fact that there is no spending on means-tested income support or 
disability benefit (invalidity benefit). Under reform 3 spending on state pensions is 
even higher than under reform 2. This shows that the cap on state pension income 
under reform 3 does not reduce spending sufficiently to finance the (re-) introduction 
of a floor on pension benefits equal to the basic state pension. In addition under 
reform 3 disability benefit (invalidity benefit) and means-tested income support are 
retained for those who retire before age 60. This leads to lower invalidity benefit 
expenditure than in the base system (as under reform 3 men aged 60 to 64 will no 
longer be able to claim it) but higher levels of means-tested income support spending 
(which is due to those retiring before 60 having no other pension income and 
therefore falling onto income support being enough to more than offset the fact that 
people will not be eligible from 60 onwards). 
  Turning to government revenues both reform 2 and reform 3 lead to higher 
levels of government receipts. Revenues from employers national insurance are 
increased by 15.4% as a result of the increase in average retirement ages. Employee’s 
national insurance receipts are increased by 22.6%. This is higher than the estimated 
increase in employers national insurance receipts because of women in paid 
employment having to pay employees national insurance contributions through to age 
65 under the reformed systems (compared to the state pension age for women of 60 
under the base system). Income tax receipts are increased even more substantially – 
this larger increase being due to more income tax being paid on the more generous 
state pension system. The increase in revenues under reform 2 is larger than the 
increase under reform 3. This is due to the earlier average retirement age under reform   24
3 and the fact that the ceiling on taxable state pension benefits reduces receipts. The 
re-introduction of disability benefit (invalidity benefit) and means-tested income 
support does not increase income tax receipts as these sources of income are not 
taxable, while those who only receive a pension income equal to the floor of the basic 
state pension will also not have to pay any income tax. (This is because their income 
will not be sufficient to take them above the income tax personal allowance). 
The overall impact on the Government’s finances from the items modelled is 
also presented in table 5.2. Under the base system there is a net surplus of €12.4bn. 
Under reform 2 this leads to a net deficit of €16.4bn and under reform 3 this would be 
even higher at €26.5bn. The cost to the exchequer of reform 2 would be €28.8bn, or 
39.2% of gross expenditure. The cost of reform 3 would be €38.9bn, or 47.6% of 
gross expenditure.  
A breakdown of net expenditure by the age at which individuals retire is 
provided in figure 5.2b. Comparing reform 2 to the base system we see that that the 
reformed system is more expensive to the exchequer at all retirement ages prior to age 
67 and with net expenditure being similar thereafter. Reform 2 is particularly more 
expensive at ages 60 and 65, as shown by the difference between the reform 2 and 
base system bars at these points. These are the modal retirement ages for women and 
men respectively. Figure 5.2b also shows that reform 3 has a greater exchequer cost 
than reform 2 at all retirement ages.  
5.3 Retirement ages and fiscal implications of reforms 1, 2 and 3, using a 
retirement model with a linear age model 
  All of the analysis so far has looked at retirement ages and the fiscal impact of 
different reforms using a retirement model containing a full set of age dummies. This 
section performs the same analysis but with the more parsimonious retirement model 
that only allows for a linear age trend. The estimated retirement ages under the base 
system, and each of the three reforms is shown in figure 5.3a. Under the base system 
the modal retirement age is estimated to be 63 and the pattern of retirement ages 
differs substantially from the more flexible model that used a full set of age dummies 
(and was shown in figure 5.1a). The changes in retirement ages caused by each of the 
reforms are all in the same direction as estimated in the model using a full set of age 
dummies. Under the base system the average retirement age is estimated to be 63.2 
years (compared to 63.1 found under the model with a full set of age dummies). 
Reform 1 leads to an increase in average retirement ages to 63.5, which is exactly the 
same as found using the previous model with no shift in the estimated age effects 
(with an age shift led to an increase to 64.9 years). Reform 2 is estimated to increase 
the average retirement age to 64.2 while reform 3 is estimated to lead to a slightly 
smaller increase to 63.7. These compare to the 64.6 and 63.9 found using the first 
retirement model.    25
The fiscal impact of these reforms, using the linear age retirement model, is 
summarised in table 5.3. Despite the very different distribution of retirement ages 
shown in figure 5.3a compared to 5.1a and 5.2a the estimated fiscal impacts are very 
similar to those obtained when using the retirement model with a full set of age 
dummies. Reform 1 is estimated to reduce total state spending by 13.4% and increase 
government revenues by 6.2%. This compares to a saving of 12.1% and an increase of 
7.6% found using a full set of age dummies and not shifting the age effects (presented 
in table 5.1). Under reform 2 expenditures are estimated to increase by 167.1% and 
tax revenues by 33.0% (compared to 161.4% and 40.9% shown in table 5.2) while 
under reform 3 expenditures are estimated to increase by 195.7% and tax revenues by 
30.0% (compared to 190.8% and 36.3% shown in table 5.2)  
Table 5.3. Total fiscal impact of reforms 1, 2 and 3, option value model with a 
linear age trend only. 
  % change on base system 
  Reform 1  Reform 2  Reform3 
  
State  pension  –24.0% 194.7% 220.1% 
Invalidity Benefit  48.6%  –100.0%  –75.0% 
Income Support  171.7%  –100.0%  32.2% 
Total  spending  –13.4% 167.1% 195.7% 
     
Employee  NI  18.9% 20.8% 17.4% 
Employer NI  4.4%  14.6%  10.3% 
Income Tax  4.2%  40.0%  37.4% 
Total Tax  6.2%  33.0%  30.0% 
     
Net expenditure  42.3%  n/a  n/a 
  
Note: Given the move from net surplus to a net deficit under reforms 2 and reform 3 it is not possible to 
express the percentage change in net expenditure.    26
Table 5.4 Decomposition of the Total Effect of Reform 1 
  Mechanical Behavioural  Total 
      
Full age dummies, no age shift     
Total expenditure  –€ 3,894  € 500  –€ 3,394 
Total taxes  € 599  € 2,485  € 3,084 
Net change  –€ 4,494  –€ 1,985  –€ 6,478 
Net change as % of net base benefits 36.1%  16.0%  52.1% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  –16.0%  –7.1%  –23.0% 
      
Full age dummies, with age shift     
Total expenditure  –€ 3,894  € 658  –€ 3,236 
Total taxes  € 599  € 6,996  € 7,595 
Net change  –€ 4,494  –€ 6,338  –€ 10,831 
Net change as % of net base benefits 36.1%  51.0%  87.1% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  –16.0% –22.5% –38.5% 
      
With linear age trend     
Total expenditure  –€ 3,976  € 247  –€ 3,729 
Total taxes  € 653  € 2,001  € 2,654 
Net change  –€ 4,629  –€ 1,753  –€ 6,383 
Net change as % of net base benefits 30.7%  11.6%  42.3% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  –16.7%  –6.3%  –23.0% 
     
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see Section 3.  
Figure 5.3b breaks down this net expenditure by the age of retirement. This 
does give a very different picture to that shown for reform 1 in figure 5.1b and 
reforms 2 and 3 in figure 5.2b. This is caused by the very different pattern of 
retirement ages estimated using a linear age trend (and shown in figure 5.3a) 
compared to those found when using a full set of age dummies (and shown in figures 
5.1a and 5.2b). The large cost of reforms 2 and 3 still arises from those retiring before 
age 67. 
5.4 Decomposing the fiscal implications of reforms 1, 2 and 3 
The fiscal impact of each of the reforms that has been described in sections 5.1 
to 5.3 can be broken down into two components. First the fiscal impact that would 
arise if the reformed system were introduced but individuals did not change their 
retirement behaviour (hereon referred to as the ‘mechanical’ effect). Second the fiscal 
impact that arises due to individuals changing their retirement behaviour (hereon 
referred to as the ‘behavioural’ effect). This section presents these two breakdowns 
for each of the 3 reforms and each of the 2 retirement models discussed so far.    27
  The fiscal impact of the first reform is decomposed into these two effects in 
table 5.4. The first set of rows takes the retirement model with a full set of age 
dummies and where the estimated age effects are held fixed. Under this model reform 
1 was estimated to reduce state expenditure by €3.4bn. The mechanical effect is found 
to reduce spending by €3.9bn, with the increase in retirement ages leading to a 
relatively small offset in expenditure of €0.5bn. This small increase is mainly due to 
an increase in state pension spending, as individuals retire later and therefore accrue a 
larger entitlement to the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). On tax 
receipts it is the mechanical effect of the reform that is relatively small at €0.6bn. This 
is due to increase employee national insurance receipts arising from the increase in 
the state pension age which is slightly offset by lower income tax receipts on the 
reduced state pension benefits. The behavioural part of the fiscal impact works in the 
same direction as the mechanical effect, due to increased tax receipts from the 
increase in average retirement ages. This is estimated to increase revenues by €2.5bn. 
The second set of rows show the mechanical and behavioural effects using the 
retirement model with the full set of age dummies and shifting the estimated age 
effects by the full three years. By definition the mechanical effect of this reform is 
exactly the same as under the previous model. The larger increase in retirement ages 
leads to larger behavioural effects. The increase in state expenditures from the 
behavioural response to the reform is still relatively small at just €0.7bn. This is due to 
the fact that for many individuals extra years of employment will not increase their 
entitlement to state pensions – for example because they are opted out of the State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), or if the extra years of work do not add 
to their best 20 years. The behavioural component of the fiscal impact is estimated to 
be larger on tax receipts. This is because the larger increase in retirement ages 
increases receipts from national insurance contributions and income tax revenues. The 
third set of rows of table 5.4 show the decomposition using the retirement model with 
a linear age trend. These are quite similar to the model with no shift in the estimated 
age effects. 
  The decomposition of the fiscal impact of reforms 2 and 3 under each of the 
retirement models is presented in table 5.5. As with reform 1 the behavioural impact 
of the reforms is found to be relatively larger in the retirement model with the full set 
of age dummies than in the model that uses just a linear age trend. This is due to the 
estimated increase in retirement ages accruing under reforms 2 and 3 being larger in 
the former model. 
Looking at state expenditure under reform 2 it is clear that the mechanical 
impact of the reform is only very slightly offset by the behavioural impact of the 
reform. The fact that the very large increase in generosity of the state system implied 
by this reform is only slightly offset by individuals retiring slightly later is 
unsurprising. With tax receipts the behavioural impact of the reforms is found to be   28
relatively more important, and as with reform 1 they are found to both operate in the 
same direction – namely to increase revenues. 
Under reform 3 the mechanical component of the fiscal effect of the reform on 
both state spending and tax receipts are estimated to be larger than under reform 2. 
This reflects the fact that reform 3 is, on average, more generous than reform 2. The 
behavioural component of the fiscal effect on both state spending and tax receipts is 
estimated to be smaller. This reflects the smaller increase in average retirement ages 
occurring as a result of reform 3. Hence with regards to state expenditures the 
behavioural components of the fiscal effect of reform 3 are very small relative to the 
mechanical component. On tax receipts both effects are still very important, and 
continue to operate in the same direction. 
5.5 Distributional impact of reforms 1,2 and 3 
The micro data used in this analysis can also be used to examine the 
distributional impact of each of these potential reforms. These are calculating each 
individuals total expected pension wealth under the base system and each of the three 
reforms. An alternative calculation would be to take the individuals incomes in each 
of the three reforms. However this seems inappropriate since a reform, such as an 
increase in the state pension age, might lead to individuals remaining in work for 
longer and therefore receiving a higher income but they would have preferred the 
unreformed system in which they could have retired earlier.  
Individuals are then placed in wealth quintiles on the basis of the wealth in the 
base system according to two different equivalence scales. The first assumes that to 
have the same standard of living couples need 2/3rds more wealth than a single 
individual. The second simply places one-fifth of single and one-fifth of couples in 
each quintile. Essentially this latter equivalence scale assumes that a couple at the 80
th 
percentile of the wealth distribution of couples is as well of as a single person at the 
80
th percentile of the wealth distribution of single individuals.   29
Table 5.5 Decomposition of the Total Effect of Reforms 2 and 3 
  Mechanical Behavioural  Total 
      
Reform 2, full age dummies     
Total expenditure  47,807  –€ 2,426  € 45,381 
Total taxes  € 7,080  € 9,508  € 16,588 
Net change  € 40,727  –€ 11,934  € 28,793 
Net change as % of net base benefits –327.4%  95.9%  –231.5% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  144.8%  –42.4%  102.4% 
      
Reform 2, with linear age trend     
Total expenditure  € 47,994  –€ 1,651  € 46,343 
Total taxes  € 7,293  € 6,847  € 14,140 
Net change  € 40,701  –€ 8,499  € 32,202 
Net change as % of net base benefits –269.7%  56.3%  –213.4% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  146.7%  –30.6%  116.1% 
     
Reform 3, full age dummies     
Total expenditure  € 54,374  –€ 719  € 53,655 
Total taxes  € 8,009  € 6,714  € 14,724 
Net change  € 46,364  –€ 7,433  € 38,932 
Net change as % of net base benefits –372.8%  59.8%  –313.0% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  164.9%  –26.4%  138.5% 
      
Reform 3, with linear age trend     
Total expenditure  € 54,381  –€ 111  € 54,270 
Total taxes  € 8,238  € 4,627  € 12,866 
Net change  € 46,143  –€ 4,738  € 41,405 
Net change as % of net base benefits –305.8%  31.4%  –274.4% 
Net change as % of gross base benefits  166.4%  –17.1%  149.3% 
      
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see Section 3.    30
Table 5.6. Distributional impact of the reforms, measured by the % change in 
pension wealth, using a simple equivalence scale. 
Quintile  System & retirement 
model  Poorest 2 3 4  Richest 
All 
  
Reform 1:   
Full age dummies, no 
age shift 
–0.2% 0.4% –5.3%  –10.4% –6.7%  –5.9% 
Full age dummies, with 
age shift 
–13.5% –14.1% –13.6% –13.6% –9.9%  –12.2% 
Linear age trend only  12.6%  7.8%  0.2%  –8.0%  –5.5%  –2.2% 
        
Reform 2        
Full age dummies  202.8% 35.3%  19.2%  –19.6% –5.9%  13.7% 
Linear age trend only  209.7% 48.3%  18.9%  –18.5% –8.0%  15.0% 
        
Reform 3        
Full age dummies  261.0% 65.1%  38.4%  5.2%  –1.5%  32.1% 
Linear age trend only  268.0% 76.5%  41.0%  5.4%  –3.3%  33.6% 
  
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see Section 3.  
Table 5.7. Distributional impact of the reforms, measured by the % change in 
pension wealth, keeping one-fifth of singles and couples in each quintile. 
Quintile  System & retirement 
model  Poorest 2 3 4  Richest 
All 
  
Reform 1:   
Full age dummies, no 
age shift 
0.9%  –1.0% –4.6% –9.8% –7.0% –5.9% 
Full age dummies, with 
age shift 
–14.4% –14.4% –12.9% –12.7% –10.5% –12.2% 
Linear age trend only  12.6% 6.9%  0.6% –7.8%  –5.7%  –2.2% 
        
Reform 2        
Full age dummies  188.6% 37.3% 16.9%  –18.5% –6.9% 13.7% 
Linear age trend only  199.3% 44.6% 18.6%  –19.0% –7.8% 15.0% 
        
Reform 3        
Full age dummies  239.2% 68.2% 36.3%  6.0%  –2.1% 32.1% 
Linear age trend only  248.5% 76.7% 40.0%  4.5%  –2.7% 33.6% 
  
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see Section 3.   31
The concern with this latter equivalence scale is that it might overstate the 
well being of single individuals since we know that on average older single people are 
poorer than older couples. However as this section will show the distributional results 
do not seem to be sensitive to the choice of either of these equivalence scales. Once 
individuals are placed in wealth quintiles according to their wealth and family size 
under the base system the total amount of wealth in each quintile is estimated. This is 
then compared to the total amount of wealth in each base quintile under each of the 
reformed systems. Working out the distributional impact in this way, rather than 
taking the average change in wealth observed across individuals, is designed to make 
our results less sensitive to any outliers which is a particular concern given our 
relatively small sample sizes.  
The distributional impact of each of the reforms using the simple equivalence 
scale is presented in table 5.6. Table 5.7 shows the distributional results assuming that 
one-fifth of single individuals and one-fifth of couples are in each quintile.  
Reform 1, which increases the state pension age, unsurprisingly leads to lower 
levels of average pension wealth. Under the retirement model with a full set of age 
dummies without any shift in the estimated age effects the reform leads to average 
losses across the top 3 wealth quintiles. This compares to no average loss in the 
poorest 2 wealth quintiles. This is caused by the availability of means-tested income 
support and disability benefit (invalidity benefit) compensating many of those who 
are out of work who do not have a private pension.  
Shifting the age effects leads to quite different distributional effects with those 
in the poorest two quintiles suffering average loses. This is because many individuals 
are now assumed to retire later as a result of the reform. This means that entitlements 
to means-tested income support and disability benefit (invalidity benefit) will be 
reduced (which are included in the estimates of pension wealth, whereas earnings are 
not). The results from the retirement model that includes only a linear age trend are 
quite different. These suggest that in fact on average those in the poorest two wealth 
quintiles will gain from the reform. However this feature simply arises from the fact 
that under this model many of these individuals estimated to be in employment and 
under the reformed system will be able to continue to accrue an additional 
entitlements to the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) when the state 
pension is increased. In practice this seems is an unreasonable estimate. This is 
demonstrated by the difference in estimated retirement rates shown in figures 5.1a and 
5.3a. 
Table 5.6 and table 5.7 also show that under reform 2 individuals are, on 
average, better off than under the base system. This is due to large increases in the 
pension wealth of those in the poorest 3 wealth quintiles, and in particular very large 
gains among those in the poorest quintile. Those in the top 2 wealth quintiles actually   32
lose on average. These differences are caused by the fact that those individuals with 
higher pension wealth under the base system will be more likely to have a private 
pension, which they will lose under the reformed system. These distributional results 
are invariant to the choice of retirement model.  
Under reform 3 the average gains across the whole population is larger than 
under reform 2. On average all of the quintiles gain from this reform compared to 
reform 2. This is because the retention of the basic state pension, means-tested income 
support and disability benefit (invalidity benefit) are worth more to each quintile than 
the fact that the earnings related component of the state pension is now capped. 
Compared to the base system the richest quintile still loses on average. Again these 
distributional results are invariant to the choice of retirement model.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The focus of this paper has been the evaluation of the fiscal and distributive 
impact of social security pension reform in the UK. We have considered three reforms 
to the state pension system that are all designed to increase the retirement age by 
changing the incentive structure underlying the pension system. The first increased 
the pension age by three years, the second introduced an actual adjustment to 
retirement before 65 and after sixty five allowing deferral to age 70. It also eliminated 
all other pathways to retirement. The final reform adapted the second reform to 
include a cap and a floor so as to mirror more closely the existing state pension 
scheme in the UK 
The simulations show that increasing the state pension age would lead to a 
lower level of expenditure on the state pension. The increase in retirement ages would 
also lead to an increase in government revenues arising from increased income tax 
and national insurance contributions. In particular employee national insurance 
receipts would increase since they would payable to new increased state pensions age. 
The increase in receipts and reduction in state spending would lead to lower levels of 
government borrowing (or larger government surpluses) than under the base system. 
At least in part this impact will be offset by increased state spending on both means-
tested income support and disability benefit (invalidity benefit).  
As age effects are so central to any microeconometric model of retirement 
transitions, the detailed simulation results were presented for different specifications. 
For reform 1 in which the state pension age is increased, the important contrast in 
these different specifications was whether the age dummies were held fixed or 
allowed to shift in line with the reform. For the first reform the overall expenditure 
under the model with the shift in age effects is 11.5% lower than under the base case 
compared to the 12.1% lower found when the age effects are held constant. We also 
find that, assuming no change in the estimated age effects, employee national   33
insurance is increased by 20.0%. Overall income tax and national insurance revenues 
are estimated to be 7.6% higher. Under the alternative assumption that the increase in 
the state pension age would also shift the estimated age effects by a full three years 
we find that government revenues from each of these sources would be increased 
further. This is due to the larger increase in average retirement ages that occurs under 
this assumption. Overall tax and national insurance revenues would be 18.7% higher 
than under the base system, compared to the 7.6%. 
Both reform 2 and reform 3 represent considerably more generous and 
therefore expensive state pension systems than the existing UK pension system. 
Under reform 2 this increase in spending is due to a large increase in spending on the 
state pension, which is partially offset by the fact that there is no spending on means-
tested income support or disability benefit (invalidity benefit). Under reform 3 
spending on state pensions is even higher than under reform 2. This shows that the 
cap on state pension income under reform 3 does not reduce spending sufficiently to 
finance the (re-) introduction of a floor on pension benefits equal to the basic state 
pension. In terms of government revenues both reform 2 and reform 3 lead to higher 
levels of government receipts. 
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Appendix A: Table A.1 Retirement transition models, with a full set of time 
dummies and with a linear time trend only. 
  Full set of time dummies  Linear time trend only 
  Men Women Men Women 
      
Total wealth  0.0608 0.0631 
  (0.0164) (0.0163) 
Option value  –0.5145 –0.4446 
  (0.3476) (0.3426) 
Spouse pension wealth  0.0280 0.0269 
  (0.0108) (0.0107) 
Net earnings  –0.0039 –0.0021 
  (0.0047) (0.0046) 
Net earnings^2  0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Partners net earnings  –0.0066 –0.0068 
  (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Partners net earnings^2  0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female dummy   0.1252  0.9176 
   (0.1611  (0.2186) 
Age difference  –0.0042 –0.0065 –0.0038 –0.0064 
  (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0039) 
Job tenure  0.0000 0.0028 0.0005 0.0028 
  (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
% FT employment  0.0535 0.0214 0.0461 0.0284 
 (0.0380)  (0.0403)  (0.0377)  (0.0405) 
Education dummy  –0.0210 –0.0088 –0.0188 –0.0191 
  (0.0196) (0.0248) (0.0199) (0.0235) 
Health score  0.0228 0.0230 0.0196 0.0206 
  (0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0095) (0.0107) 
Partners health score  –0.0090 –0.0201 –0.0110 –0.0176 
 (0.0067)  (0.0123)  (0.0068)  (0.0122) 
Renter  –0.0177 –0.0053 –0.0165 –0.0057 
  (0.0223) (0.0306) (0.0225) (0.0306) 
Mortgage  –0.0357 –0.0293 –0.0366 –0.0289 
  (0.0202) (0.0226) (0.0203) (0.0229) 
Industry = engineering  0.0525 –0.0382 0.0482 –0.0439 
  (0.0433) (0.0438) (0.0423) (0.0415) 
Industry = manufacturing  –0.0006 n/a  0.0039  n/a 
  (0.0373) n/a (0.0379) n/a 
Industry = distribution  –0.0053 0.0398  0.0059  0.0328 
  (0.0343) (0.0704) (0.0365) (0.0675) 
Industry = services  –0.0540 –0.0310 –0.0500 –0.0400 
  (0.0246) (0.0446) (0.0259) (0.0429) 
Industry = government  –0.0122 –0.0070  0.0090  –0.0176 
 (0.0407)  (0.0597)  (0.0467)  (0.0551) 
Spouse retired  0.0688 0.1170 0.0756 0.1069 
  (0.0395) (0.0550) (0.0396) (0.0534) 
Occupational pension  0.0649 0.0290 0.0606 0.0148   37
 (0.0252)  (0.0372)  (0.0245)  (0.0350) 
£1 – £3,000 wealth  0.0235 –0.0119 0.0246 –0.0016 
  (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0302) (0.0328) 
£3,000 – £10,000 wealth  0.0358 0.0339 0.0361 0.0435 
  (0.0371) (0.0457) (0.0369) (0.0480) 
>£10,000 wealth  0.0233 –0.0326 0.0325 –0.0226 
 (0.0390)  (0.0330)  (0.0403)  (0.0366) 
Missing wealth  0.0414 –0.0480 0.0672 –0.0445 
  (0.0613) (0.0373) (0.0659) (0.0401) 
Linear age term  n/a n/a  0.0305  0.0211 
  n/a n/a  (0.0042)  (0.0054) 
Age = 57  0.0298 –0.0218  n/a  n/a 
  (0.1187) (0.0590)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 58  0.0003 0.0010  n/a  n/a 
  (0.0956) (0.0642)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 59  0.0134 –0.0096  n/a  n/a 
  (0.1013) (0.0592)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 60  –0.0031 0.1961  n/a  n/a 
  (0.0916) (0.1102)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 61  0.0124 0.1247  n/a  n/a 
  (0.1001) (0.1010)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 62  0.0142 0.0713  n/a  n/a 
  (0.1016) (0.0937)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 63  0.0980 0.1270  n/a  n/a 
  (0.1420) (0.1182)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 64  0.1365 0.0997  n/a  n/a 
  (0.1595) (0.1256)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 65  0.5369 0.4000  n/a  n/a 
  (0.2002) (0.1816)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 66  0.2555 0.5152  n/a  n/a 
  (0.2157) (0.3772)  n/a  n/a 
Age = 67  0.3585 n/a  n/a  n/a 
  (0.2382) n/a  n/a  n/a 
Age = 68  0.2615 n/a  n/a  n/a 
  (0.2455) n/a  n/a  n/a 
Age = 69  0.4353 n/a  n/a  n/a 
 (0.2655)  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Age = 70  0.7241  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 (0.2226)  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Number of observations  1,998 1,998 
Pseudo R2  0.197 0.153 
Log likelihood  –661.525  –697.758 
      
Note: Marginal effects are report. Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted by *** 
= 1% level, ** = 5% level, *=10% level.   38
FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: The UK Pension system, 1990 
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Figure 5.1a. The distribution of retirement ages under the base system and 




















Reform 1 (no age shift)
Reform 1 (with age shift)
Note: For details of the specification of the retirement model see Section 3. 
 
Figure 5.1b. Net expenditure under the base system and reform 1, by age of 
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Figure 5.1c. Gross expenditure under the base system and reform 1, by age of 
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Figure 5.1d. Income Tax and National Insurance Contribution receipts under the 
base system and reform 1, by age of retirement, using an option value model and 


























Reform 1 (no age shift)
Reform 1 (with age shift)
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Figure 5.2a. The distribution of retirement ages under the base system, reform 2 























Figure 5.2b. Net expenditure under the base system, reform 2 and reform 3, by 
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Figure 5.3a. The distribution of retirement ages under the base system, reform 1, 
























Figure 5.3b. Net expenditure under the base system and reform 1, by age of 
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